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CHAPTER V

CLAIMS CONCERNING LAWFUL WEAPONS OF
BELLIGERENT ATTACK
The chapters of the present study appraising the claims and counterclaims concerning combatants, areas of operation, and objects and methods
of belligerent attack each considered subject matter which is highly specialized in terms of submarines and submarine warfare. Modern submarines,
however, do not possess complete_ly distinctive weapons. The traditional
gunnery, torpedo, and mine weapons of submarines which employ nonnuclear explosives are also used by surface warships. In the same way, the
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, or substantially similar ones, which
are employed by modern attack and missile submarines may also be used by
other combatant units including surface warships, military aircraft, and
land- or space-based launching systems. 1
A consideration of the law applicable to submarines must necessarily
include a juridical appraisal of the weapons which these warships are capable of using. This is a matter of particular urgency in conne<rtion with
the contemporary "weapons of mass destruction." 2 The existence of
such weapons has changed the quoted phrase from a figure of speech to
a fact.

A. THE HISTORIC EXPERIENCE CONCERNING THE ABOLITION OR LIMITATION OF WEAPONS
Although international law has not been particularly successful in abo~ishing or controlling weapons of war in the past, it is nevertheless essential
to have an awareness of the historic experience. It should provide meaningful background to the contemporary attempts to achieve juridical con1

The nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of modern submarines are surveyed
in the text of Ch. I accompanying notes 39-43. For a prescient prediction of the
offensive capabilities of modern submarines see Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men
68- 70 ( 1949). Concerning space-launching systems see infra note 30.
2
Such weapons are regarded as including biological, chemical, and nuclear ones.
See generally Dept. of Defense, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (rev. ed. 1962);
Dept. of the Army, Chemical, Biological and Rad,iological Operations (FM 3- 5;

1961).
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trol of weapons. 3 This history should indicate, at the least, that modern
problems concerning this subject are not entirely novel.
In early warfare, knights had substantial military advantages over peasant soldiers. Dr. Royse states that, prior to the introduction of the crossbow, "not a single knight would be killed in a battle, due to the heavy
protecting armour." 4 When the crossbow came into use, it appeared to
be a terrible and indiscriminate weapon of destruction since it could be
used to kill mounted knights as well as humble foot soldiers. 5 The Second
Lateran Council of the Roman Church ( 1139) prohibited the use of the
crossbow and described it as a weapon which was "hateful to God and
unfit for Christians." 6 In spite of this formal interdiction, the crossbow
remained in general military use until more efficient weapons employing
gunpowder replaced it. Dr. Royse has summarized the result of this advance in weapons technology:
Powder and firearms in early times were also cursed as the devil's
implements, and the Chevalier Bayard, fatally wounded in 1524 by
a bullet, found some satisfaction in the thought that he had never
given quarter to a musketeer. There was no pause, however, in the
use of explosives and firearms. 7
The principal limitation upon weapons stated by Hugo Grotius in 1625
in his classic study of The Law of War and Peace was the prohibition of
the use of poison. 8 He stated that this prohibition existed "from old times." 9
It probably reflected the inefficiency of poison as a weapon. The Grotian
interdiction was formulated in broad terms so as to include poisoning food
and water as well as using weapons the points of which were tipped with
poison. 10 The contemporary prohibition is stated in the Regulations
Annexed to Hague Convention IV ( 1907) and prohibits the employment
of "poison or poisoned weapons." 11 Neither of these is likely to be efficient
in modern war but they are probably still employed upon occasion by
guerrilla and tribal military forces.
The Declaration of Paris ( 1856) has been examined in the considera3

See e.g. Sixth Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, H.R. Doc. No. 58, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1967); U.S. Arms Control ·and
Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1965 ( 1966).
' Royse 166 (footnote ami tted).
5
Royse 166. The crossbow was a leveler since it deprived knights of their prior
status of "equal but ... more equal." See Orwell, Animal Farm 148 (1946).
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Royse 166; see also Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations 18 (rev.
ed. 1954).
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Royse 167 (footnotes omitted).
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Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libris Tres, Bk. III, Ch. 4, sections 15-16, 2
Classics of International Law 651-53 (Kelsey transl. 1925).
9
Id. at Ch. 4, section 15, p. 652.
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Id. at Ch. 4, sections 15-16, pp. 651-53.
11
Art. 23 (a ) .
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tion of the traditional law of naval warfare. 12 Its first article provided
for the abolition of privateering. In spite of the abuses connected with
privateering which sometimes made it very similar to piracy/ 3 the United
States refused to accede to the Declaration. In his Message to the Congress
of December 2, 1856, President Pierce stated:
The aggressive capacity of great naval powers would be thereby
[through the abolition of privateering] augmented, while the defensive
ability of others would be reduced. 14
The Declaration of St. Petersburg ( 1868) 15 prohibited the use of
projectiles or bullets of a weight below 400 grammes (approximately
fourteen ounces) which were explosive or which contained "fulminating
or inflammable substances." 16 At the time of the Declaration, such bullets would have caused more serious wounds and a greater probability
of death to troops against whom they \vere used than would the nonexplosive bullets then in use. After the development of flying vehicles for
military purposes, it became apparent that such projectiles had great
military efficiency and they have been used in aerial warfare starting with
the First World War. 17
The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 have been examined from
the standpoint of the combatant status of submarine warships. 18 Another
significant aspect of the Conferences concerns the treatment of aerial
bombardment. This subject is particularly suitable for brief examination
here because the strategic bombardment capability of the modern fleet
ballistic missile submarine is one contemporary method of conducting
aerial bombardment.
Although the 1899 Conference was not successful in "abolishing" submarines, it produced a Declaration concerning aerial bombardment which
provided:
The Contracting Powers agree to prohibit, for a term of five years,
, the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other
new methods of a similar nature. 19
The balloon had not been used for the launching of projectiles or explo. sives although it had been employed in war for purposes of observation.
Neither the free nor the captive balloon could be controlled in a way
which made it likely to be an efficient bombing instrumentality. Con12

The Declaration is set forth in the text of Ch. IV accompanying note 32.
Colombos 471-72.
u 1 Savage, Policy of the United States Toward Maritime Commerce in War
394, 395 (Dept. of State 1934).
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Text in 2 Dept. of the Army, International Law 40 (Pamphlet 27-161 - 2; 1962).
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Ibid. Larger explosive or shrapnel projectiles were not prohibited.
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Royse 144.
18
See the text of Ch. II accompanying notes 11-24.
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sequently, its use could be prohibited for a time without imposing a military detriment upon any of the major powers. These considerations were
persuasive in bringing about the unanimous vote for a temporary interdiction of it as an instrument of aerial bombardment. 20
The "other new methods of a similar nature" referred to in the Declaration were of particular significance. Since the Wright brothers'
heavier-than-air flight experiments were not successful until 1903, it seems
probable that this reference to new methods concerned lighter-than-air
dirigibles. The interdiction of aerial bombardment proposed by Russia
had been at a time when Russian dirigible efforts had failed but experiments conducted by other states were being successful in varying degrees. 21
Since the dirigible could be maneuvered and controlled, except in unfavorable weather conditions involving high winds, it could probably
become an efficient aerial bombing vehicle. This prospective technical
improvement in dirigibles was the principal reason for changing the
original Russian proposal of permanent interdiction to a five-year term. 22
During the five-year period, there was no inhibition upon further experiments with dirigibles and the matter of "new methods" of aerial bombing
could be considered again after the expiration of the term in 1904.
The Hague Conference of 1907 met in an atmosphere which was not
conducive to the restriction of efficient weapons. 23 In addition, substantial
technical improvements had been made in dirigibles. 24 A number of the
major European military powers had such "airships" in use. In Germany,
the famous Count Zeppelin was demonstrating their technical capabilities. 25
France had an airship program second to none. 26 Although it had no
actual wartime experience to its credit, it was becoming clear that the
dirigible airship had significant military potential. Like the balloon, it
had a weight-lifting ability but it had the added advantage of being able
to direct its bombs to a particular military objective. The airship's then
relatively great altitude capability and the lack of antiaircraft guns and
other surface-to-air weapons made it almost immune from ground attack.
It should also be mentioned that the heavier-than-air airplane was in
such a primitive stage of development that its subsequent effectiveness . as
an antiairship device was not then foreseen.
In the military context just described, the minor military powers joinedwith Great Britain in favoring a renewal of the 1899 ban on aerial born20
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25
I d. at 63-64.
26
I d. at 67-68.
21

155
bardment. 27 The British correctly foresaw the de facto end of their military advantages based on their geographical situation as an island, and
the smaller powers with comparatively inadequate scientific capabilities
recognized that the major powers would quickly achieve superiority in
airships. The continental powers, and in particular France and Germany,
were eager to retain and improve the ai·rship. 28 The result \vas that no
limitations were placed upon aerial bombardment.
The lack of restrictions upon aerial bombardment at the 1907 Conference gave at least some indication that the airship and the heavier-than-air
aircraft would be accorded status as lawful combatant units in future war
or hostilities. Such status was subsequently established beyond any doubt. 29
As shown in Chapter II, the lawful combatant status of the submarine
warship has been firmly established after a long decisional process. Thus
in the present century combatant units which have been found to function
with military efficiency in relativel-y new warfare environments, the air
and under the sea, have been accorded lawful status. 30
Dr. Royse has accurately summarized the results of attempted weapons
limitation at the Hague Conferences.
Such destructive weapons, fot instance, as the high explosive shell, the
shrapnel, mines or torpedoes, were retained as legitimate means of
warfare, whereas the inefficient expanding and explosive bullets
were condemned along with the perfectly useless free balloons. The
proceedings of the Hague Conference[ s] demonstrate rather that a
weapon will be restricted in inverse proportion, more or less, to its
effectiveness; that the more efficient a weapon or method of warfare
the less likelihood there is of its being restricted in action by rules of
war. 31
Unfortunately, this analysis does not provide a realistic basis for a favorable prediction concerning present and future weapons abolition or limitation. The tremendous capabilities of modern weapons of mass destruction, however, make the objective of their effectively sanctioned abolition
much more urgent now than was weapons abolition at the time of the
Hague Conferences. Until this objective is reached the juridical control
of such weapons remains a vital goal. 32
~

Id. at 59, 66.
~ ld. at 67.
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Spaight 76-1 07 considers the "combatant quality" or status of aircraft.
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"Objects" carrying weapons in space are prohibited by
Nations draft Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
in 55 Dept. of State Bull. 952, 953 (Dec. 26, 1966).
31
Royse 131 - 32.
33
See the recommendation concerning disarmament 1n the

art. 4 of the United
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B. CLAIMS CONCERNING WEAPONS OF ATTACK IN
GENERAL WAR
In appraising juridical control of weapons of attack it is necessary to
distinguish between the claims concerning the legality of particular weapons per se and the related claims concerning the legality of the use of the
weapons. It is clear that a weapon (or a combatant unit) otherwise legal
can be employed in an illegal manner. 33
It is probably accurate to state that the juridical criteria which has
been developed to determine the lawfulness of particular weapons is based
upon both the principles of military necessity and of humanity. 34 In the
application of this criteria, however, the principle of humanity is usually
considered only after the principle of military necessity is given controlling
weight. The result is, in general, that only weapons which cause destruction and injury which is unnecessary for the attainment of military objectives are deemed unlawful.
Professor Hyde stresses the role of military decision in stating the "underlying legal principle" in determining the lawfulness of weapons:
The task of specification is primarily a military rather than a legal
one, calling for technical opinion whether the blows to be inflicted
by new instrumentalities such as those designed and employed in the
course of World War I possess a military value which outweighs in
significance the severity and magnitude of the suffering caused by
their use and likely to be incidentally felt by non-combatants. 35
In a comparable formulation of the basic criteria, Professor Garner
states:
The employment of new and powerful inventions of destruction or
of new methods is, of course, not to be condemned and ruled out
merely because they are new or because they are more effective than
those formerly employed, as a few sentimentalists in every age have
wished to do. The true test of their lawfulness is rather whether they
can he· employed without inflicting superfluous injury upon those
against whom they are employed, whether they "uselessly aggravate
the sufferings of disabled men," whether their effect is cruel and inhumane, and the like. 36
Dr. Spaight has also set forth the same accepted criteria in an unusually
blunt formulation:
It is really by its fruits that the engine of war is judged. The test
33

The appraisal in Ch. II, for example, was restricted to the submarine's combatant status and left open the issues relating to the lawfulness of its various uses.
34
Dr. Royse refers to the same principles functionally as "utilitarian grounds" and
"social sanction." Royse 13 7 and passim.
35
Hyde 1814.
36
1 Garner 282. Prof. Garner argued the unlawfulness of particular uses of German
submarines in World War I but did not question their lawful combatant status. I d.
at 355-83.
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of lawfulness of any weapon or projectile is practically the answer
one can give to the question-What is its "bag"? Does it disable so
many of the enemy that the military end thus gained condones the
suffering it causes? 37
Th~ criteria for a weapon to meet the test of lawfulness may be summarized by stating that it must not cause a destruction of values which
is disproportionate to the military advantage gained thr-ough its use. 38
The historical experience in applying the criteria appears to indicate that
weapons will be upheld as lawful except where there is a great disparity
between the ensuing destruction of values and the military advantage
gained. An obvious example of illegal weapon use would be a delayed
action bomb which is dropped by an aircraft during the war but explodes,
killing and wounding civilians, after the war has ended.
Conventional rules elucidate, but do not appear to change, the customary law criteria stated by the writers.- The Regulations Annexed to Hague
Convention IV ( 1907), for example, provide that it is especially forbidden
"to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering." 39 Since it is clear that the use of all efficient weapons of war
causes human suffering, this conventional rule should be interpreted reasonably as prohibiting only that suffering which is "unnecessary" in relation
to the military advantage derived from the use of the weapon. The U.S.
Army's official publication on land warfare law provides helpful interpretation:
What weapons cause "unnecessary in jury" can only be determined
in the light of the practice of States in refraining from the use of a
given weapon because it is believed to have that effect. 40
There is little or no indication in "the practice of States" that efficient
weapons which bring substantial net military advantage of their belligerent
users have not been used because of ancillary injury and suffering caused
to the enemy belligerent. In the instances where efficient weapons have
nqt been used it is probable that other reasons have existed such as the
potential threat of the use of the same weapon by the enemy and consequent doubts as to its net military advantage. 41

1. Traditional Naval Weapons
The appraisal under the present heading examines the lawfulness
of traditional weapons and excludes consideration of weapons with mass
destruction capabilities. Early naval wa rfare often involved the maneuver37

Spaight, Wa r R ig h ts on L and 76-77 ( 1911 ) .
See th e statement of the test by Prof. McDougal and Dr. Feliciano quoted in the
tex t a ccompanying infra note 128.
39
Art. 23 (e ) . Art. 22 of the same Regulations provides this general admonition:
" T he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."
40
Law of L an d W arfare paragraph 34 (b).
'
41
E.g. the nonuse of gas weapons in combat in World War II.
38

158
ing of warships with the object of boarding enemy vessels and capturing
them through procedures which included hand-to-hand combat. 42 An
interesting early form of chemical weapon for use in naval warfare, "Greek
fire," was invented about 600 B.C. 43 Its significant characteristic was that
it burst into flames spontaneously upon contact with water. Apparently
the destruction of values involved in its use was not considered disproportionate to its efficiency.
Guns, torpedoes, and mines are among the most traditiona! naval
weapons which are still in use and they have been employed by surface
and submarine warships alike. 44 Their legality appears to have been simply
assumed rather than argued. The muzzle loading naval gun dealt terrible
destruction to the opposing enemy in the days of sailing warships, but its
efficiency apparently justified it juridically. It is well known that the naval
gun and its projectiles have been greatly improved in range, accuracy,
and destructive power in the present century. Thus the long-range guns
firing projectiles weighing about one ton which were used at Jutland and
at Surigao Strait destroyed enemy capital ships and killed and wounded
enemy personnel. No question was raised concerning their lawfulness. Had
such questions been raised, they would have been rejected because of the
undoubted military efficiency of the guns.
The torpedoes which were immortalized by Admiral Farragut at Mobile
Bay were stationary explosive devices. 45 Hague Convention VIII ( 1907)
recognized generally the lawful status of self-propelled torpedoes by forbidding the use of such torpedoes which "do not become harmless when
they have missed their mark." 46 In both World Wars torpedoes were
high-speed devices with high-explosive warheads which could be accurately
aimed at the selected object of attack. They constituted the principal
armament of submarines and their legality as weapons was not challenged. 47 During the Second World War the Japanese developed and used
a much larger and more efficient torpedo than those generally in use at
the time. It was termed a "Kaiten" or "long lance torpedo" and may be
described accurately as either a large torpedo or a small submarine manned
by a single crewman who guided the device to the target and was ~illed.
42

See Potter & Nimitz 1-20.
Report of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Research in CBR
(Chemical~ Biological~ and Radiological Warfare)~ H.R. Rep. No. 815, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., 3 (1959).
44
The naval aspects of weapons considered in the textual paragraph are based
upon Potter & Nimitz passim.
45
The words attributed to the Admiral are: "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam
ahead!" The Admiral stated that he sought guidance through prayer. Potter &
Nimitz 320.
46
Art. 1, paragraph 3. The text of the Convention is in 2 Scott 428.
47
The lawfulness of some of their selected objects of attack was, of course, challenged as indicated in Ch. IV passim. 43

159
tn the ensuing explosion. 48 Even though it carried a larger explosive
charge and created greater destruction than smaller torpedoes, its lawfulness was assured because its destructiveness was not disparate in relation
to its military efficiency. By the same reasoning, the British midget submarines or "X-craft" which carried out successful attacks upon the German
battleship Tirpitz 49 are lawful whether they are regarded as weapons or
as submarine combatant units.
The military efficiency of the automatic sea mine was demonstrated
during the Russo-Japanese War shortly before the opening of the Hague
Conference of 1907. 50 The British delegation to this Conference initially
proposed a total interdiction against the use of unanchored mines but
later retreated to a more moderate position and, although expressing grave
doubts about it, 51 adhered to the ensuing Convention. The German delegation regarded the mine as a necessary and efficient instrument of warfare. 52
Hague Convention VIII provides in part:
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and
ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial
shipping. 53
It was always possible, of course, for a belligerent employing mine
warfare to claim that the mines were laid for additional purposes beyond
that of intercepting commercial shipping. The ineffectiveness of the conventional provision was demonstrated by the experience in both World
Wars where mines caused great destruction of human and material values.
Mines were scattered off enemy coasts and were systematically employed
in minefields and mine barrages. 54 The most notable example of the latter
was the great North Sea Mine Barrage laid by the United States which
has been referred to previously. 55 Mines were also employed in both World
Wars as an ancillary method of enforcing submarine operational areas.
Hague Convention VIII provides further that anchored automatic contact mines must be so constructed as to become harmless when they have
broken from their moorings 56 and that similar unanchored mines must
be cqnstructed so as to become harmless within an hour of their Ia unch-

ta The technical statements concerning the "Kaiten" are based upon Yokota &
Harrington, Suicide Submarine! ( 1962); Yokota & Harrington, "Kaiten-Japan's
Human Torpedoes," 88 Nav. Inst. Proc. No.1, p. 55 (1962).
49
Factual description appears in Wilkinson, "Tirpitz Tale," 80 Nav. Inst. Proc.
375 (1954).
50
Potter & Nimitz 354.
51
1 Scott 581, 585-86.
52
I d. at 586-87.
53
Art. 2.
54
See e.g. Potter & Nimitz 456, 470.
55
See the text of Ch. III accompanying note 62.
66
Art. 1, paragraph 2.
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ing. 57 It is clear that the military efficiency of uncontrolled mines which
are drifting about is doubtful since they might do substantial harm to the
launching belligerent as well as to the enemy belligerent. There is no doubt
that drifting mines subjected neutral shipping to hazards and damage
which continued after the conclusion of active hostilities. 58 This continuing sea-mine danger in time of peace demonstrated violation of these
conventional law doctrines.
Sea mines, like other traditional naval weapons, have undergone continuing technical improvement. In the Second World War acoustic and
magnetic mines, among other types, were employed. 59 None of these
technological improvements have deprived sea mines of their status as
lawful weapons since their increased destructiveness is not disproportionate
to their military efficiency.

2. Traditional Naval Bombardment
Surface warships are the typical vessels which conduct traditional
bombardment but submarines with deck-mounted guns have a bombardment capability. 60 The conventional rules concerning naval bombardment
of objects of attack located upon land are formulated in Hague Convention IX Respecting Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of War
( 1907) .61 The first article prohibits the bombardment by naval forces
of undefended places. Article 2, however, provides for a substantial modification of the prohibition:
Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or
war materiel, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the
needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbor,
are not, however, included in this prohibition. 62
Thus, military objectives could be bombarded lawfully even though located
in undefended towns and ports. In bombarding such undefended locations
the naval commander was required to "take all due measures in order
that the town may suffer as little harm as possible." 63 In summary, these
conventional doctrines embody the test of the lawful military objective
which is based upon the primacy of factors of military efficiency. ,T he
57

Art. 1, paragraph 1.
Reference is made to such hazards following the Russo-Japanese War in 6
Hackworth 503.
59
Roskill 47-48, 117, 379.
60
The t;luee largest pre-World War II U.S. Navy submarines, the Argonaut,
Narwhal, and Nautilus, each mounted two 6-inch guns (the same size typical
of light cruisers). Parkes (ed.), fane's Fighting Ships 1934 493. Shore bombardment by the Nautilus during World War II is described in Potter & Nimitz 799.
61
Text in 2 Scott 436.
62
Art. 2, paragraph 1.
63
Art. 2, paragraph 3.
68
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humanitarian factors involved in the concept of " undefended places" are
given, at best, subordinate consideration.
Since Hague Convention IX did not specifically provide for the situation
concerning defended places, it seems clear that even the modest limitations
upon the naval bombardment of undefended places do not apply to places
which are defended. In modern combat situations where a coastal state
has some military air power, it is likely to be assumed that the state is
defended.
In the juridical application of Hague Convention IX in both World
Wars, defended land areas were lawful objects of attack. As a practical
matter, of course, they could not be bombarded unless they were within
the range of naval gunfire. 64 If the places on land were undefended, they
were also lawful objects of attack providing that the military objectives
referred to in article 2 of the Convention could be identified as targets.
In this latter situation, harm to the civilian population which was incidental to the attack upon the lawful military objective was not prohibited.
During the Second World War in both the Pacific and European theatres
Allied naval gun power was employed as an effective part of the great
amphibious attacks upon enemy-defended locations. 65

3. Biological and Chemical Weapon s
The principal weapons of the fleet ballistic missile submarine are
Polaris missiles with the capability of carrying warheads containing either
traditional explosives or nuclear or thermonuclear explosives. 66 Since these
are the typical weapons, they may be regarded mistakenly as the only weapons of these submarines. General Rothschild, however, has written:
As far as missiles are concerned, it is obvious to anyone with an
acquaintance with toxic munitions, and who has seen a picture of
a Polaris, that it could carry biological, and possibly cherrucal,
agents. 67
Chemical warfare and biological warfare have been defined as follows:
Chemical warfare is the intentional em ployment of toxic gases,
liquids, or solids to produce casualties, and the use of screening smoke
M For example, the U.S.S. Colorado_, a battleship which participated in ten major
amphibious operations in the Pacific W a r, had a main battery of eight 16-inch guns.
These · guns had a maximum range of 33,300 yards. Parkes, op. cit. supra note 60
at 467.
65
See Potter & Nimitz 745-48 and passim.
66
These weapons are described in the text of Ch. I accompanying notes 39- 40.
67
Rothschild, Tomorrow's Weapons : Chemical and Biological xiv (1964). Prior
to his retirement, General Rothschild was Commanding General, U.S. Army Chemical Corps Research and Development Command. I d . at xi. The same writer refers
also to other U.S. Navy chemical warfare capabilities. I d. at 78.
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or incendiaries. Biological warfare is the military use of living organisms or their toxic products to cause death, disability, or damage
to man, his domestic animals, or crops. 68
An unusual feature of a biological weapon is that its first impact is
designed to lead to successive ones. 69 Thus, a germ weapon which leads
to a mass epidemic is like fire in that it is self-propagating. It is also like
fire in that it does not distinguish between belligerent users of the weapon,
the opposing belligerents, and neutrals among its victims. It is probably
much less subject to effective military control by its belligerent user than
is fire. Because of this, it is necessary to question the net military advantage
to the belligerent user of a weapon which may inflict devastating injury
upon friend and foe alike. While such biological weapons may be "efficient"
in the sense of causing indiscriminate mass destruction, that efficiency
which is relied upon as a factor in establishing the lawfulness of a weapon
is military efficacy in the controlled destruction of lawful military objectives. In addition, it is clear that weapons which make civilians direct
objects of attack are unlawful. 70
The Hague Conference of 1899 agreed to a Declaration concerning
chemical warfare which provided:
The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles
the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious
gases. 71
The gases referred to are now recognized to be but a part of the comprehensive arsenal of chemical warfare. At the time the Declaration was
adopted there had been no adequate experimentation much less use, concerning gas shells, and the action of the Conference, consequently, was
taken without knowledge as to whether the destructiveness caused by gas
shells would be in excess of that necessary to attain a lawful military objective. Captain Mahan has indicated the inadequacy of the knowledge
on the subject. 72
The military effectiveness of poison gas was demonstrated during the
First World War. 73 Even though this chemical weapon presents some of the
same problems concerning indiscriminate destruction as do biological weapons, it seems probable that chemical weapons are more controllable than
biological ones.
68

Op. cit. supra note 43 at 3.
See e.g. the hypothetical biological warfare attack upon the United States where
the weapons are assumed to be launched from submarines. It is described in the
[Washington] Evening Star, Feb. 9, 1967, A-12, cols. 1-7.
70
See the criteria quoted in the text accompanying infra note 128.
11
Text in 2 Scott 155.
72
Scott ( ed.), The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference
of 1899 283 ( 1920).
73
Op. cit. supra note 43 at 3-4.
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In initiating the use of gas in land warfare in 1915 Germany avoided
the precise wording of the Hague Declaration by disseminating the gas
through canisters fixed to the ground with favorable wind conditions being
relied upon to direct the gas against the enemy. 74 The Allied Powers
retaliated in kind, and before long gas attacks were carried out by the use
of cylinders and bombs as well as by the projectiles forbidden by the
Hague Declaration. 75 In addition to the claims of legal right, reprisals
were invoked by both sides. 76 By the end of the war gas attacks were in
common use, although ·regarded with considerable reprobation except
when used against the enemy. 77
At the end of World War I gas weapons were abolished for the defeated
powers. The Treaty of Versailles with Germany, for example, provided
in relevant part:
The use of asphyxiating, poisonous 'or other gases and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and
importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. 78
Similar prohibitions were placed in the other peace treaties. 79
The principal attempt to abolish gas as a weapon is set forth in the
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
( 1925) .80 This Gas Protocol, using language substantially identical to that
in the unratified Washington Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines
and Noxious Gases in Warfare ( 1922) ,81 provides :
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world ... 82
The parties to the Gas Protocol agreed to "accept the prohibition" and
also agreed "to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. . . ." 83 Most of the great powers, except the United
States and Japan, became parties to the Gas Protocol.
7

1 Garner 272.
I d. at 272-73.
76
I d. at 2 73.
77
The propaganda and psychological attitudes of the time concerning the use of
gas, and submarines as well, are described in Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in
the World War 111-12 (1927).
78
Art. 171.
79
The Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, art. 135; the Treaty of Trianon with
Hungary, art. 119; the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, art. 82; the Treaty of
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There is convincing evidence that Fascist Italy used gas warfare against
primitively armed tribesmen during the attack upon Ethiopia. 84 There is
also evidence that Japan used it from time to time against the Chinese. 85
It is usually stated that gas warfare was not employed during the Second
World War. This statement is accurate if it is interpreted as restricted to
the use of gas in combat situations. During the war, President Roosevelt
indicated that the United States would not employ gas warfare unless it
was first used by the Axis Powers. 86 Since both sides had a substantial
chemical warfare capability, it is probable that the Axis Powers could not
foresee a net military advantage in using gas. The result was an effective
deterrence of the use of gas weapons 87 not unlike the present deterrence
of the use of nuclear weapons.
The Nazi murder of millions of innocent men, women, and children
is one of the most terrible and tragic events in history. It is well known
that poison gas was one of the principal weapons used in perpetrating
these crimes against victims who were regarded as "inferior'' in the Nazi
ideology. The reports of the various war crimes tribunals are replete with
the details of these atrocities. 88
Chemical and biological weapons, along with nuclear ones, comprise
the principal instruments of mass destruction in the contemporary arsenal
for total war. The nerve gases, developed by Germany during the Second
World War, are among the most significant in the current chemical warfare stockpiles. 89 They include Tabun (GA) and Sarin (GB). Less than
a minute of exposure to either of these gases is fatal and casualties are
created before the presence of the gas can be detected. 90 They penetrate
the body mechanism either through inhalation or by liquid drops which
enter through the skin and disrupt nerve signals to the muscles. 91
It may not be assumed accurately that the chemical and biological
arsenal only comprises weapons of lethal characteristics. It also includes
weapons which are only temporarily disabling. A riot-control device such
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as tear gas is a well-known example. 92 Whether in a general war or in
a limited one, it is obviously more humanitarian to disable guerrilla troops
who are located in a cave or a similar position by the use of tear gas rather
than to incinerate them with a flamethrower.
General Rothschild recommends the use of gas warfare for humanitarian
reasons as well as for military ones. Referring specifically to the United
States amphibious attack upon Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll in 1943, he
emphasizes the almost complete destruction of the defending Japanese forces
and the heavy casualties among U.S. Marines. 93 These casualties among
the attackers took place in spite of the tremendous aerial and gunfire
bombardment preceding the landing. General Rothschild states that a gas
warfare attack upon Betio would 'have drastically reduced both United
States and Japanese casualties. In his view, many "more [Japanese] probably would have lived and recovered tompletely, following gas attacks"
even if mustard gas had been used. 94 He inquires:
In figh ~ing without toxic [chemical] weapons, then, we are being
humane to whom? To the Americans who were killed or wounded
unnecessarily? To the Japanese who were killed almost to a man by
being burned out of their shelters with flame throwers, or forced out
with white phosphorous grenades or hand grenades so they could be
shot? 95
The sources of the doctrines concerning the control of biological and
chemical warfare comprise both conventional and customary law. The
principal conventional source is, of course, the Geneva Gas Protocol ( 1925)
which prohibits the initial use of biological and chemical warfare between
the adhering states. A significant issue concerning customary international
law as a source of relevant doctrines must be considered. Has the Gas
Protocol been accepted as customary law so that all states, including those
which did not adhere to it, are now forbidden the initial use of chemical
warfare? Based upon the substantial nonuse of chemical warfare in combat situations since the conclusion of the First World War, Professor 0'Brien has made a careful argument that there now exists customary law
binding upon all states which forbids the first use of such warfare. 96 There
9
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is no doubt as to the desirability of this conclusion concerning the existence
of a comprehensive prohibition based upon the customary law. Unfortunately, there is serious doubt as to whether or not the nonuse of gas relied
upon indicates customary lawmaking. It seems more probable that it reflects rather the common conviction of belligerents as to the lack of net
military advantage in employing chemical weapons in situations where
these are possessed by both sides. 97
The Gas Protocol also prohibits the use of "bacteriological methods of
warfare." 98 It is clear, therefore, that the first use of biological warfare
is also prohibited as between the adherents to the Gas Protocol. It is rather
difficult, however, to attempt to make a customary law argument based
upon the nonuse of biological warfare analogous to that which Professor
O'Brien has made concerning chemical warfare. One reason is that biological warfare has not been used at all. Its nonuse since the Gas Protocol
in 1925, consequently, cannot be claimed with much conviction to demonstrate the development of applicable customary law. The result of this is
that the first use of biological warfare is prohibited only to the states which
adhere to the Gas Protocol.
The contemporary situation may be summarized by stating that there
is a conventional and possibly also a customary prohibition upon the first
use of chemical warfare and a conventional prohibition only upon the
first use of biological warfare. As Professor O'Brien has demonstrated,
these prohibitions are more apparent than effective. 99 There are convincing reasons which support this conclusion of the lack of effectiveness or
sanction of the prohibitions. For example, there are apparently substantial
stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. In addition, there is no
limitation upon scientific inquiry and development of these weapons in
the existing doctrines. There are, indeed, no inspection procedures whatsoever to implement the Geneva Gas Protocol. In this context, peaceful
states which neglect research and development in biological and chemical
weapons for both defensive and offensive purposes act at their peril. 100
97

Prof. O'Brien recognizes some of the considerations stated in the text but he
regards them as consistent with customary lawmaking in this situation. O'Brien, op.
cit. supra note 96.
98
The context of the quoted words is indicated in the text accompanying supra
notes 82-83.
00
O'Brien, op. cit. supra note 96 at 55-56.
100
Description and criticism of such research and development appears in Langer,
"Chemical and Biological Warfare (I) : The Research Program," 155 Science (pub.
of the Amer. Assoc. for the Advancement of Science) 174 (Jan. 13, 1967); Langer,
"Chemical and Biological Warfare (II) : The Weapons and the Policies," 155 id.
299 (Jan. 20, 1967). The concern of some scientists about the subject as expressed ·
in a petition to President Johnson states, in part: "The employment of any one CB
weapon weakens the barriers to the use of others." I d. at 302. See also the inserted
comment entitled "University of Pennsylvania: It's Hard to Kick the Habit." I d. at

167
The neglect of such research and development could result in placing the
most peaceful states in the world community at the mercy of the least
peaceful ones. 101
The relevant prohibitions upon the use of biological and chemical warfare extend, as stated above, only to an interdiction of the first use of
these weapons. This interpretation is required by the availability of the
doctrines of legitimate reprisal which legalize the use of otherwise unlawful weapons in response to the prior use of such weapons. Where a biological or a chemical weapon is used illegally in violation of the applicable
doctrines, it seems clear that the use of these weapons, or either of them,
in retaliation could be justified juridically as legitimate reprisals. 102 This
assumes, of course, that the retaliatory use is directed and controlled and
does not involve militarily meaningless mass destruction.

4. Nuclear Weapons
a. THE LAWFULNESS OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

In the foregoing subheadings and in the ensuing text the word
"nuclear" is used broadly to cover both nuclear and thermonuclear weapons except where a distinction is made between them explicitly or through
the context. It is a commonplace observation that a nuclear weapon,
because of its massive destructive capability, is not "just another weapon."
Such a basic energy weapon involves the very rapid release of a tremendous
amount of energy within a small space by the fission or fusion of atomic
nuclei. 103 It is difficult to conceive the force and ensuing damage from
the resulting explosions which may now be produced. All individuals who
cherish moral values, and human life itself, must be appalled by the destructiveness of these weapons. A useful explanation in relatively nontechnical language of the blast and other effects involved appears in the
latest revision of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. 104
The legal scholar who values human dignity and consensual as opposed
to coercive procedures has a particular obligation to attempt to advance
the effective legal control of these weapons. Unless international lawyers
provide constructive leadership in solving this central challenge of our
177. The University of Pennsylvania responded to the pressure campaign against
chemical and biological research contracts with the U.S. Government by giving
them up. See "Snice Rack and Summit: A Season's Discontent over Classified Research," 65 Pennsylvania Gazette No.7, p. 14 ( 1967).
101
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times, the result could be the destruction of human life and social processes on a massive scale.
The present appraisal focuses narrowly upon the issue of the lawfuless
of nuclear weapons per se. Subsequent appraisal will conisider the issues
involved in determining the lawfulness of some of the uses of these weapons.
Their capability of mass destruction 105 and other characteristics must
compel humanitarians to wish devoutly that they may be accurately characterized as illegal. One should not, however, summarily appraise these
weapons as "unlawful" without consideration of the several relevant issues
including, for example, the availability of sanctions to make the appraisal
meaningful.
Some international lawyers, acting upon humanitarian motives, have
attempted to declare the existing illegality of nuclear weapons. These
lawyers have placed heavy reliance upon certain international conventions
as well as general principles of customary international law. Since the conventions and principles which are invoked long preceded the existence,
or even the serious contemplation, of nuclear weapons, the arguments
to support the claim of illegality must necessarily employ analogy and
extrapolation.
The St. Petersburg Declaration ( 1868) prohibiting the use of weapons
"which would uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render
their death inevitable" 106 is one of the conventions relied upon. Another
conventional formulation which is functionally similar to the first clause
of the Declaration appears in the Hague Regulations ( 1907). It especially
prohibits the use of "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering." 107 Both of these provisions are usually interpreted
as manifestations of the basic principle requiring a reasonable proportionality between the military efficiency of the weapon and the ancillary
destruction of human values. Dr. Singh, however, reasons that even if
the other destructive effects of nuclear weapons explosions are not considered, nuclear radiation combined with the radioactive fallout come
within the quoted prohibition in the Hague Regulations. 108 Perhaps the
100
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principal inadequacy of this argument is that it does not include a demonstration that the use of these weapons results necessarily in the destruction
of human values which is out of all proportion to their military efficiency.
In order to be persuasive, such a demonstration should extend to the
varying factual contexts of future coercive situations involving the use
of nuclear weapons including the magnitude of the explosions and the
character of the objects of attack.
The second clause of the St. Petersburg Declaration refers to rendering
the death of disabled men "inevitable." Professor McDougal and Dr. Feliciano have pointed out that this conventional rule does not prohibit
weapons which kill as opposed to those which only wound since all weapons,
including the bow and arrow for example, can under certain conditions
render death inevitable. 109 Dr. Spaight, however, as one aspect of an
argument which concludes that nuclear weapons are illegal, suggests that
this reference is to weapons which have the effect of leaving the wounded
victim "with no hope of survival." 110 It has been accurately pointed out
that the presence or absence of "hope of survival" by an individual depends
upon a number of variables in the specific factual context including the
gravity of the particular injury and the ready availability of medical services.111 These factors are operative whether the in juries involved result
from gunfire, radiation, or other causes.
Dr. Schwarzenberger, who also places his analysis upon basic humanitarian considerations, has reached the same conclusion that nuclear weapons are illegal. 112 While he relies upon other rules as well, he puts principal
emphasis upon the customary and conventional doctrines which prohibit
the use of poison and poisoned weapons. The "true ratio legis," 113 in his
view, is that radiation and poison are substantially the same thing. He
states:
[A] fairly strong case can be made for the assimilation of radiation
and radioactive fall-out to poison. If introduced into the body in
sufficiently large doses, they produce symptoms which are indistinguishable from those of poisoning and inflict death or serious damage
to health in, as Gentili would have put it, a manner more befitting
demons .than civilised human beings. 114
Dr. Schwarzenberger is correct, of course, in pointing out that sufficiently
large amounts of radiation can cause death. I t is also true th at sufficiently
large gunshot wounds can produce death. It is not suggested, however,
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that guns should be deemed unlawful weapons of war. Radiation effects
are usually associated with nuclear explosions but they are regarded as
ancillary to the principal blast effects. 115
In an analogy drawn from the prohibition upon the use of poison gas,
Dr. Schwarzenberger relies upon the Geneva Gas Protocol which, it will
be recalled, prohibits "asphixiating, poisonous, or other gases" and, in
addition, •'all analogous liquids, materials or devices." Dr. Schwarzenberger states:
If the radiation and fall-out effects of nuclear weapons can be likened
to poison, all the more can they be likened to poison gas which is
but an even more closely analogous species of the genus "poison." 116
These interesting analogies and derivations drawn from the use of the
word-symbols "poison" and "poisonous, or other gases" in earlier and
different contexts reflect accurately the revulsion which all humanitarians
share regarding nuclear weapons. The central issue concerning lawfulness
which must be resolved, however, is whether or not all possible uses of
nuclear weapons, taking into account the wide variations in the possible
factual contexts, must always involve disproportionate destruction of
h uman values in relation to the military efficiency of the weapons.
The utility of an analogy drawn from past experience in solving a new
p roblem depends, of course, upon whether the fundamental values and
policies in the analogy are similar to those involved in the new problem.
The historic and contemporary prohibition upon the use of poison appears
to be based upon its inefficiency as a weapon. 117 Such an analogy does
not seem to be particularly helpful in ascertaining the lawfulness of nuclear
weapons since it does not consider the issue of their efficiency. In the same
way, the prohibition upon the initial use of poison gas, and its observance
in combat during the Second World War appear to be based upon substantial doubt as to the net military utility where both sides possess the
weapon. 118 The question as to the net military utility of nuclear weapons
in different factual contexts raises issues which go beyond the poison gas
analogy. In addition, nuclear weapons with distinctive characteristics of
their own are of such importance that they necessitate direct appraisal.
In view of these fundamental considerations, analogies, even though based
upon humanitarian objectives, provide an inadequate problem-solving
methodology in determining the lawfulness of nuclear weapons. Even if
it is assumed that the analogies invoked possess some contemporary relevance, they should be employed only as ancillary analytical techniques.
There is, in summary, no adequate alternative to a direct analysis which
115
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considers the characteristics and the uses of the wide range of weapons
which are subsumed under the label of "nuclear." 119
There are further persuasive reasons to doubt that nuclear weapons
are now illegal without qualification. Two nuclear weapons, as is well
known, were actually employed just before the end of the Second World
War. In addition, large numbers of these weapons exist in the military
stockpiles of the two military "superpowers" as well as in smaller numbers
in the stockpiles of three other major powers. However distressing it may
be, the existence of these weapons indicates the possibility, or even the
probability, of their use in certain types of future coercive situations.
It is ancient juridical wisdom that legal analysis involves more than
logic. 120 Even if it were assumed that the analogies of writers arguing the
illegality of nuclear '"'·eapons were logically unexceptionable, this would
only be a portion of the necessary analysis. Experience suggests that the
concept of "law" is more meaningful when associated with at least the
possibility of some enforcement or sanction than when used without reference to enforceability. 121 The writers urging the illegality of nuclear
weapons appear to give little or no consideration to the sanctions problems.
The determination of such illegality without even a remote prospect of
enforcement creates illusion rather than the type of more effective social
control usually associated with the concept of "law." 122 It is a particularly
dangerous illusion since it could lead to the belief that the difficult and
complex processes involved in the effective control of nuclear weapons
have already been achieved. It appears to be the wiser juridical analysis,
as well as the safer one, to determine the issue of the lawfulness of nuclear
weapons with full regard for the necessity to combine doctrines with
sanctions to achieve enforceable law.
Unlike the situation concerning biological and chemical weapons, there
are no conventional rules which even purport to prohibit or limit nuclear
weapons. It seems unsound and dangerous to assume illegality in the
absence of express and direct conventional agreement. 123 In addition, it
119
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is probable that the nonuse of nuclear weapons since 1945 indicates considerations such as the absence of a general war rather than the development of customary agreement prohibiting these weapons.
It is well known that the three principal nuclear powers, the United
States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, have been engaged
over a considerable period of time in diplomatic negotiations which are
designed to achieve an international agreement under which nuclear weapons would be effectively "outlawed" or "abolished." 124 This tends to
support the view that nuclear weapons are lawful, at least in some contexts,
until the negotiations result in such an agreement. Such weapons appear
to be valid now in the same way that the persistent claims designed to
make the submarine an unlawful combatant unit conceded its lawful status
by necessary implication, at least pending the achievement of a prohibitory
agreement.

b. THE LAWFULNESS OF PARTICULAR USES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The use of biological and chemical weapons as legitimate reprisals
in response to the illegal use of these same weapons has already been
considered. 125 Even if it is assumed that nuclear weapons are unlawful,
it seems clear that they may be lawfully used as legitimate reprisals in
retaliation to the unlawful use of such weapons. There may also be other
grim situations in which their use should be upheld juridically under the
doctrines concerning legitimate reprisals. Professor Lauterpacht has provided this example:
[I]f during the Second World War it had become established beyond
all reasonable doubt that Germany was engaged in a systematic plan
of putting to death of millions of civilians in occupied territory, the
use of the atomic bomb might have been justifiable as a deterrent
instrument of punishment. 126
It does not, of course, require extended legal argument to demonstrate
that the Nazi killings of millions of innocent civilians were mass murders.
It is well established that the purpose of reprisal measures is to deter
illegal acts and it is obvious that these particular illegal acts should have
been deterred if at all possible. Only one qualification, therefore, is suggested concerning Professor Lauterpacht's statement. If the atomic bomb
had been used as a deterrent, it could be justified properly as a reprisal
only if it had been directed with the greatest possible precision at the Nazi
murderers so as to minimize, and if possible eliminate completely, the
ancillary killing of the victims of the Nazis and of other civilians.
1
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It will be recalled that, aside from the doctrines regarding reprisals,
the accepted test concerning the lawfulness of the use of a weapon is that
it must not create value destruction which is out of proportion to the
military advantage achieved by it. 127 A different test to determine the
lawfulness of nuclear weapons has not been developed in either conventional or customary international law and, consequently, the traditional
test must be applied to these new weapons. Professor McDougal and Dr.
Feliciano have made this careful formulation of the test:
[T]he fundamental policy of minimum unnecessary destruction may
be seen to underlie questions of legitimacy.... [W]here the suffering
or deprivation of values incidental to the use of a particular weapon
is not excessively disproportionate to the military advantage accruing
to the belligerent user, the violence and the weapon by which it is
effected may be regarded as permissible. All war instruments are
"cruel" and "inhuman" in the sense that they cause destruction and
human suffering. It is not, however, the simple fact of destruction,
nor even the amount thereof, that is relevant in the appraisal of such
instruments; it is rather the needlessness, the superfluity of harm, the
gross imbalance between the military result and the incidental injury
that is commonly regarded as decisive of illegitimacy. 128
Claims relating to the lawfulness of particular uses of nuclear weapons
may be considered conveniently in two subsidiary categories. The first consists of claims concerning the fact situations which may occur in naval warfare in a future general war. The second comprises claims concerning the
fact situations which may occur in "strategic" nuclear bombardment In
such a war. 129
( 1) Claims Concerning Nuclear Weapons in Naval Warfare
Relatively small atomic weapons of the type usually characterized
as "tactical" have been developed for specialized use in naval warfare. 130
In addition to the homing high-speed torpedoes with nuclear warheads
which comprise significant submarine offensive weapons, there are also
nuclear weapons which have particular significance in antisubmarine warfare. Professor Kuenne has described one of these as follows:
127
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The atomic depth charge, Lulu, which can kill a submarine within
two or three miles of its detonation point, can be dropped only if friendly
surface craft are not in the vicinity. 131
A traditional depth charge with TNT explosive which is directed with
precision at a submerged submarine will most usually sink the submarine
and result in the killing or drowning of its entire crew. In achieving such
destruction, the nuclear depth charge is very similar to the traditional
one. The greatly enhanced efficiency of the nuclear charge, ho\t\·ever, is
evident in its ability to "kill" a submarine within a radius of "two or three
miles of its detonation point." The military result is that one nuclear depth
charge, even when employed with imprecise aiming is probably more
likely to destroy a submarine than a number of better aimed traditional
charges. In a general naval war in which both attack submarines and
fleet ballistic missile submarines are employed, it is difficult to believe that
only traditional depth charges and torpedoes will be employed in attacking
them. The reasons for this conclusion include the existing stockpiles of
these "tactical" weapons and the naval expectations concerning their use. 132
There is no doubt, of course, concerning the status of such belligerent
warships as lawful objects of attack.
In view of the great military efficiency of "tactical" nuclear depth
charges, torpedoes, and similar weapons in the situation described, they
will probably be appraised as lawful providing that the ancillary destruction of values is not disproportionate to their military efficiency. There is
no doubt that there would be some ocean water contamination involved
in the use of these and other nuclear weapons at sea. In addition, the
sinking of a nuclear-powered submarine would probably cause further
water contamination. 133 In view of the primacy which has been historically accorded to military efficiency in general war, there is reason to
believe that the traditional criteria would be applied to uphold the lawfulness of "tactical" nuclear weapons at sea in future general wars. This
tentative prediction, it must be emphasized, assumes the minimization of
ancillary injuries to both of the belligerent sides and to the neutrals.
The use of the "strategic" or very large thermonuclear weapons at sea,
however, would probably be unlawful in the tactical naval warfare situa131
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tions just described. Such large weapons would produce much greater
environmental contamination. Where a tactical nuclear weapon would
achieve the same military purpose, such excessive contamination as well
as other excessive ancillary damage is unnecessary and therefore unlawful.
In the same way, such large weapons could result in an unlawful "overkilJ"
by the destruction of values beyond those necessary to obtain the military
objective.
There are different naval warfare contexts in which it is even possible
that the use of "strategic" thermonuclear weapons may meet the test of
lawfulness. Prior to the Second World War, naval battles were conducted
typically with each of the battle fleets within visual sight of the other.
The Battle of the Coral Sea in the early part of the Second World War
was the first major naval engagement in which the principal combatant
ships did not come within visual contact. 1_34 The decisive aspect of the
battle was the attacks made by airplanes from the fleet aircraft carriers.
It is not impossible in a future general war at sea that a squadron of submerged fleet ballistic missile submarines may employ thermonuclear weapons in attacking a similar squadron of the enemy belligerent. Polaris missiles, as is \veil known, may be launched while the submarine is submerged.
There are apparently no technical reasons why these or similar weapons
could not reenter the water environment after their flight and seek out
their submarine targets. 135 The present issue concerns the lawfulness of the
employment of thermonuclear weapons in the assumed situation. If it
could be demonstrated that these weapons possess the efficiency which is
necessary to achieve the military objective and, further, that tactical nuclear weapons lack such efficiency, it would be persuasive as to the lawfulness of this use of thermonuclear weapons. If it could also be demonstrated
that the ancillary destruction of values injuring the belligerents and the
neutrals was minimal, it would further strengthen an argument of lawfulness. In making such a determination concerning the issue of legality, it
would be necessary to give full consideration, inter alia, to both the shortrange and long-range effects of envirnomental contamination. 136

(2) Claims Concerning Strategic Nuclear Bombardment
One of the principal military capabilities of the fleet ballistic
missile submarine is the bombardment of targets located on land with
,nuclear or traditional explosives. Because of this, the ensuing legal analysis
is functionally similar to that usually described as "aerial bombardment"
or "strategic bombardment." In a juridical appraisal the particular type of
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marine warship, a surface one, an aircraft, a land-based installation, or a
launching system in space 137 would not appear to be of major significance.
(a)

CLAIMS CoNCERNING TARGET SELECTION

The hypothetical situations considered concerning nuclear war
at sea were relatively simple in one respect because they involved only
military targets. Target selection in land areas where civilian populations
reside presents more difficult issues.
The only treaty law concerning target selection in aerial bombardment
appears in the Regulations Annexed to Hague Convention No. IV ( 1907):
The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited. 138
The words, "by whatever means," were probably designed to refer to
dirigibles and heavier-than-air aircraft at the time they were written. It
would be a rather extreme over-extrapolation to interpret them as somehow referring to ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and other contemporary weapons which were not even thought of in 1907. 139 This conventional doctrine was an attempt to apply by analogy the land warfare
test of "undefended" towns used at the turn of the century to the different
problems involved in aerial bombardment. Land warfare rules concerning
bombardment at that time were formulated on the basis of the technology
of land artillery which was then probably more efficient than the aerial
bombardment methods. It is well known that this provision of the Hague
Regulations was not observed in aerial bombardment in either of the World
Wars. 140
The somewhat more relevant analogy which has been employed in
actual practice in aerial target selection is drawn from the naval bombardment test of "military objectives." This test as applied to traditional naval
bombardment was limited technologically by the range of naval gunfire.
In applying the test of "military objectives" to nuclear bombardment by
modern military aircraft, Polaris missiles, and space-launching devices, it
is apparent that there is no place upon the earth which cannot be reached.
A place, however, cannot lawfully be subjected to bombardment unless a
military objective is located in it.
Although they are not conventional law, the draft Hague Rules of
Aerial Warfare ( 1923) 141 adopt this military objective test which has been
applied in both World Wars:
Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military
137
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objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury
would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent. 142
An obvious example of a target which is a lawful military objective is a
naval shipyard. An equally obvious example of unlawful target selection
was involved in the German use of the V-1 (flying bomb) and V-2 (longrange rocket) weapons near the end of the Second World War. These
weapons were simply directed at a general area comprising metropolitan
London without regard to any military objective. 143
The actual historical facts indicate, however unpleasant the contemplation of this may be, that considerable ancillary civilian destruction has
been tolerated in the application of the test providing that the target is a
lawful military objective. This is, nevertheless, better than a doctrine which
would allow civilians to be made direct objects of attack. Professor Lauterpacht's characterization of the fundamental principle of customary international law prohibiting the use of terror airected against civilians as "an
absolute rule of law" has been referred to previously. 144 Unless this basic
humanitarian doctrine is effectively sanctioned, it is futile to attempt to
maintain that there is a meaningful international law of war. If this single
principle is violated systematically, the subsidiary doctrines which are designed to protect humanitarian values are rendered meaningless. 145 In an
era of weapons of mass destruction with rapid missile delivery techniques
there is a measure of sanction to enforce this principle at least in the
decisions of rational government officials. If one side can employ terror
against the civilian population in a general war situation, it is apparent
that the other can do the same thing. This is a negative sanction to implement a humanitarian doctrine but it is of use nonetheless if it operates
with some effectiveness. The positive sanctions include a mental perspective of common humanity which encompasses the enemy civilians as well
as those of the same nationality as the decision-maker. The conjoining of
these sanctions, with any other available ones added, constitute only ad hoc
devices to provide some measure of protection for humanity pending the
construction · of a better world public order system which, at the least,
effectively prevents general war. 146

(b) CLAIMS CoNCERNING THE LIMITATION OF DESTRUCTION
The present analysis concerns the issues involving the limitation of ancillary destruction where it is assumed that a lawful target is
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attacked. Rules of ideal doctrinal content would, of course, prohibit any
ancillary destruction of or injury to civilians in attacks on lawful military
objectives. The difficulty with such a doctrinal formulation is that experience indicates it has little or no prospect of being enforced in a future
general war. It is clear that in the relevant past belligerent practices, states
have tolerated substantial ancillary destruction of civilian values. The fact
is, even taking into account the development of efficient bombsights, radar
instruments, night and bad weather guidance techniques, and similar
devices, that as many as a third of the bombs dropped by aircraft usually
fall outside of "a large factory" target. 147 The central factual point is that
the bombardment of military objectives, as a matter of uniform past experience and probable future expectation involves some incidental destruction
of civilian life.
The draft Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare ( 1923) attempted to prohibit
what is now termed "strategic bombardment." The relevant provision
states:
The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings
not in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is
prohibited. 148
This reflects an attempt to limit aerial bombardment to tactical situations
where the use of the bombardment is closely related to "the operations of
land forces."
It is well known that during the Second World War massive "strategic
bombardment" employing large numbers of aircraft carrying traditional
explosives was used. 149 This method of bombardment was practiced by the
major belligerents even though the selected military targets such as factories or military installations were in heavily populated areas where it was
clear that many civilians would be and were killed. In the same way, the
two uses thus far of nuclear weapons during war, the attacks on Hiroshima
and on Nagasaki, involved great destruction of civilian lives although
military objectives were at the center of the targets. 150
The International Committee of the Red Cross Draft Rules ( 1956) provide constructive suggestions designed to minimize the ancil1ary destruction
of civilians. One modest provision, for example, states:
1 7
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The person responsible for ordering or launching an attack shall,
first of all:
(a) make sure that the objective, or objectives, to be attacked are
military objectives within the meaning of the present rule and
are duly identified.
When the military advantage to be gained leaves the choice
open between several objectives, he is required to select the one,
an attack on which involves least danger for the civilian population ...151
Since it does not interfere with military efficiency, this provision should be
implemented to minimize harm to civilians.
United States v. Ohlendorf 152 presents a judicial perspective concerning
the ancillary destruction of civilians in aerial bombardment. The facts of
the case concerned the infamous Einsatzgruppen which were the special
task forces employed by the Nazis to murder the "inferior" civilian persons
behind the military lines in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. The
defendants claimed, inter alia, that there was no meaningful distinction
between the systematic killing of civilians who were members of one or
more of the proscribed groups as the defendants had done and killing
civilians with atomic bombs as the United States had done in Japan. 153
In response to this argument the judgment stated:
A city is bombed for tactical purposes; communications are to be
destroyed, railroads wrecked, ammunition plants demolished, factories
razed, all for the purpose of impeding the military. In these operations
it inevitably happens that nonmilitary persons are killed. This is an
incident, a grave incident to be sure, but an unavoidable corollary of
battle action. The civilians are not individualized. The bomb falls, it
is aimed at the railroad yards, houses along the tracks are hit and
many of their occupants killed. But that is entirely different, both in
fact and in law, from an armed force marching up to these same railroad track~, entering those houses abutting thereon, dragging out the
men, women, and children and shooting them. 15 4
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
characterized the "wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity" as a war crime. 155 None of the
major war criminals, however, was charged with indiscriminate aerial
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bombing. In addition, the United Nations War Crimes Commission in
preparing lists of persons who, prima facie~ appeared to have committed
a war crime, rejected cases alleging illegal aerial bombardment if the
places bombarded contained military objectives. 156
Dr. Spaight has attempted to make a fundamental legal discrimination
between strategic bombardment which involves target-area bombing by
large numbers of aircraft using traditional weapons and strategic bombardment using atomic weapons. He states:
[International law] should hold to the view that, while target-area
bombing comes close to the borderline of permissibility, atom bombing definitely oversteps it. To change the metaphor, one might say
that target-area bombing remains anchored-under strain-to the
rule of the military objective, which must now be regarded as international law; atom bombing breaks adrift. 157
This argument appears to be based on the assumption that where nuclear
weapons are employed there is no possibility whatsoever of limiting the
ancillary destruction connected with the attack upon the military target.
The opposite assumption is made concerning target-area bombing. Both
assumptions seem to be open to considerable doubt because of the contemporary range in the size and explosive power of various nuclear weapons and the past conduct of target-area bombing. It does not seem possible
to state with certainty that under no circumstances could a nuclear weapon,
or several of them, be used in a manner which effectively limits ancillary
destruction. Although as used by the Allied Powers during the Second
World War, target-area bombing with traditional weapons placed very
few effective limitations upon ancillary destruction, such bombing could
also be used so as to limit such destruction more effectively.
The significant differences for present purposes between traditional
explosives employed in very large quantities and one or more nuclear
weapons concern the initial and residual effects which are associated with
the nuclear weapons. 158 The "dirty" nuclear weapon is one which places a
large amount of radiation in the environment. 159 Such radiation, and its
consequent deadly or injurious effects, will be manifested in the immediate
area of the explosion in particular and throughout the world environment
in general over a considerable period of time. 160 On the other hand, _a
"clean" nuclear bomb is designed, like traditional bombs, to be deadly in
its blast and heat effects but to minimize the associated radiation effects. 161
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The radiation effects of the "dirty" bomb can impose continuing destruction upon the civilian population after the bombing has stopped. It seems
clear, consequently, that this type of effect from the use of nuclear weapons may impose unreasonably high and disproportionate levels of destruction upon the civilian population. These factual differences justify a different juridical appraisal of such nuclear weapons. It should be maintained
that where the radiation effects are likely to cause such high and disproportionate levels of destruction of the civilian population, the nuclear
weapon should be regarded as unlawful in a situation where a number of
traditional weapons with the same blast and heat effects would be deemed
lawful. Among the sanctions to uphold this differential juridical treatment
is the common self-interest of all mankind, including rational decisionmakers, in preserving the earth and its environment as habitable for
humanity.
The comments concerning the military inefficiency of biological or
chemical weapons which are uncontrollable by their belligerent users are
equally applicable to nuclear weapons which are similarly uncontrollable.
The International Committee of the Red Cross Draft Rules ( 1956) make
this recommendation concerning uncontrollable weapons:
Without prejudice to the present or future prohibition of certain
specific weapons, the use is prohibited of weapons whose harmful
effects-resulting in particular from the dissemination of incendiary,
chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or other agents-could spread to
an unforeseen degree or escape, either in space or in time, from the
control of those who employ them, thus endangering the civilian population.162
In such an extreme situation, considerations of humanity and those of
military efficiency should be combined to protect common humanity from
mass destruction. The most obvious way to avoid destruction of civilian
values by nuclear weapons is not to use such weapons. The constructive
contemporary use of nuclear weapons is in their role as inducements to
avoid general war. They are now being used as the key element in a mutual
deterrence system which establishes a primitive minimum public order
based on the threat of mutual nuclear disaster. 163

C. CLAIMS CON·CERNING WEAPONS OF ATTACK IN
LIMITED WAR
In the appraisal of other aspects of limited war, a central distinction
has been made between limited wars involving major powers as the par162
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tictpants and similar wars where minor powers comprise the participants.
Such an organization appears less useful in considering the lawfulness of
particular weapons in limited war situations. Most states have armaments
which include, even though in very modest degree in some instances,
traditional naval weapons. 164 In addition, there is an existing trend toward
the proliferation of nuclear weapons which will apparently continue unless
conventional agreements are reached to prevent it effectively. 165 The
present organization, consequently, will consider the same weapons categories used in the general war analysis. At the outset, it should be stated
that the limitation of weapons is indispensable if limited wars are not to
be replaced by or "escalated" into general wars. 166
Weapons of mass destruction which are uncontrollable in the hands of
their belligerent users have been referred to in the context of general war.
Even in general war situations, such weapons cannot be justified as lawful
by the most expanded conceptions of military necessity since they do not
achieve military objectives without disproportionate ancillary destruction. 167
It is obvious that they also lack military efficiency and lawfulness in limited
war. A narrow conception of the tactical controllability of weapons is also
necessary in limited war situations and the weapons used must be consistent with the limited political objectives which are postulated. 168
The customary law test involving a determination of the reasonable
proportionality between the military efficiency of the weapon and the
ancillary <~estruction of values caused by its use is also employed in determining the lawfulness of weapons in limited war. 169 The point which must
be stressed, however, is that the same juridical principle used in weapons
appraisal in general war is now being applied in the very different context of limited war. If it is assumed that exactly the same weapon were
used in each type of war, a certain degree of ancillary destruction of values
which would be acceptable in general war might well be quite unacceptable and, consequently, unlawful in limited war.
A recognized naval authority has written concerning the combat capabili~ Le Masson ( ed.), Les Flottes de Combat 1966 lists eighty states which have
navies (or functionally equivalent organizations) with associated vessels and weapons.
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ties of the U.S. Navy in the war in Vietnam:
The United States Navy is ... a gentle giant. It must be a source
of wonder to many a nation, especially to any aggressively inclined,
why the United States, with such a colossal naval strength at its command, capable of landing any size of military force and mounting any
size of air strike, has not bulldozed her way to the objective in Vietnam. The U.S. Navy is doubtless capable not only of containing any
possible combination of Vietnamese forces arrayed against it but of
countering any force that any co-belligerents might have available
in that sphere. Yet, the U.S.N. attack craft, surface, submarine or air,
the amphibious ships, support vessels, transports and auxiliaries have
shown the restraint necessary 'to channel down the operations to
limited and conventional war. 170
In his 1967 State of the Union Message the President of the United
States stressed other factors than weapons- capability and military power.
His statement raised a fundamental question concerning the conduct of
limited war by the United States:
Whether we can fight a war of limited objectives over a period of
time, and keep alive the hope of independence and stability for people
other than ourselves; whether we can continue to act with restraint
when the temptation to "get it over with" is inviting but dangerous;
whether we can accept the necessity of choosing "a great evil in order
to ward off a greater"; whether we can do these without arousing
the hatreds and the passions that are ordinarily loosed in time of waron all these questions so much turns. 171

1. Traditional Naval Weapons
The weapons now under consideration are the same traditional ones
which have been considered in connection with general war. Such weapons of considerable destructive power have been employed in limited wars.
During the Korean War, for example, the North Korean forces employed
~odern sea mines, including acoustic and magnetic types, with considerable effectiveness. 172 The Soviet Union provided technical assistance in
these operations. 173 It is necessary to recognize that because a weapon may
be accurately characterized as "traditional" does not, without more consideration, provide reasonable assurance of the lawfulness of its use in all
Blackman ( ed.), fane's Fighting Ships 1965-66 iv~ v.
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the divergent fact situations of limited war. If the traditional torpedo with
a warhead of TNT explosives were used against merchant ships not participating in the war or hostilities, for example, it would be a violation of
the Submarine Protocol. In addition, such use might make the continuing
limitation of the war most difficult if not impossible.
It should be obvious that the availability of traditional weapons of all
kinds, including specialized naval ones, is indispensable for limited war
purposes. 174 In the same way, there must be a carefully thought out and
continuingly updated naval doctrine concerning weapons uses in limited
war. 175 If these important matters are not adequately recognized the
results could be disastrous. A major power which neglects traditional
weapons and tactical nuclear ones in favor of overemphasis upon large
nuclear and thermonuclear ones could be confronted with a situation
where it has no better alternative than a choice between general war
involving the use of weapons of mass_ destruction on the one hand or surrender on the other.

2. Traditional Naval Bombardment
The historic examples of traditional naval bombardment of land targets
which were mentioned in connection with general war situations involved
only modest legal limitation upon the efficiency of the bombardment because of the "military objective" test employed in the applicable conventional law. 176 Military interest, nevertheless, imposed meaningful limitations upon needless destruction of values. The basic military principle of
economy of force required the careful control of naval gunfire so as to
maximize military injury to the enemy. It is well known that naval gunfire, along with aircraft bombing attacks, was used as the spearhead of the
great United States amphibious operations in the Pacific War. 177 In this
use of naval gunfire it was not a matter of promoting the principle of
humanity alone to direct the gunfire at specific military objectives, such
as gun installations and aircraft runways, but it was also a matter of simple
174
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self-preservation. Unless the Japanese military targets on land were effectively destroyed, they had the capacity to sink or severely damage the
battleships 178 and other warships comprising the attack force.
The conjoining of the principles of humanity and military necessity to
protect human values should be even more important in a limited war
naval bombardment situation. The United States amphibious landing at
Inchon in the early part of the Korean War was preceded by a heavy
naval bombardment. 179 The specific character of this bombardment has
been authoritatively described as follows:
Vice Admiral Struble's orders to the bombardment forces clearly
specified that there should be no promiscuous firing at the city itself
or at civilian installations. To achieve this, the entire objective area
had been divided into 60 sub-areas. Known military targets had been
previously assigned, and those which offered the greatest potential
hazard to our landing troops were circled in red. It had been agreed
that any ship could fire into a red-circle area with or without a
"spot." In the uncircled areas, however, firing was permitted only if
definite targets were found and an air spot was available. This differentiation between types of areas was adopted to reduce destruction
of nonmilitary targets to a minimum, to save the city of Inchon for
occupation forces, and to avoid injury to civilian personnel. . . .
[Struble ordered:] Bombing and gunfire will be confined to targets
whose destruction will contribute to the conduct of operations-accurate gunfire and pinpoint bombing against specific targets, rather
than area destruction, is contemplated. 180

3. Biological and Chemical Weapons
The juridical appraisal concerning the use of biological and chemical
weapons which are uncontrollable by the belligerent user in general war 181
is even more applicable, a fortiori, in limited war situations. If biological
or chemical weapons are to be used lawfully in limited war they must be
weapons of very limited destructive power which are employed under the
178
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most rigid technological and tactical controls. It is unfortunate that the
broad language in the Geneva Gas Protocol referring to "poison gases"
and then to "all analogous liquids, materials or devices" 182 is susceptible
through mechanical interpretation to the inclusion of nonlethal biological
or chemical weapons which produce temporary disablement of enemy
personnel without permanent damage to the human organism. Such
mechanical interpretation 183 is, of course, quite inconsistent with the
humanitarian purpose of the Gas Protocol to prevent the use of highly
injurious and destructive gases.
There are many situations in which the use of tear gas, or similar chemical agents, imposes much less damage or injury upon enemy personnel
than alternative weapons. The use of tear gas in preference to flamethrowers against guerrilla troops located in entrenched positions has been
referred to in connection with a general war situation. 184 The humanitarian considerations in favor of the use of tear gas would appear to be at
least equally applicable in a limited war situation. Another example involves the use of weapons to control riotous prisoners of war. This was a
practical situation which arose with North Korean prisoners of war in
United States prisoner of war camps. 185 Riots among the prisoners were
apparently initiated for the purpose of involving effective military forces
which might otherwise have been used at the front. Rifles and machine
guns were used at the outset to reestablish discipline in the camps. The
use of tear gas was finally authorized for humanitarian reasons as well as
for efficiency. 186 General Mark Clark, then the Commander of the United
Nations Forces in Korea, apparently experienced some difficulty in obtaining authorization for the use of this gas which is harmless in residual
effects. 187 The reluctance of the Department of the Army to authorize the
use of tear gas in this situation apparently reflects the general revulsion
shared by military personnel with civilians against any weapon which can
be included under the label "gas." It is most unfortunate in terms of the
impact upon human values that word symbols 188 present difficulties in
using less harmful and less destructive weapons. If limited weapons are to
be used in limited wars, the responsible decision makers must look beyond
the labels to the actual effects of particular weapons.
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Psychological conditioning and mental predispositions are, of course,
important factors in obtaining popular acceptance or rejection of weapons. Popular views and prevailing opinions upon this subject are- also
factors which have some bearing upon the determination of lawfulness.
Mr.- Tompkins has written concerning weapons acceptability:
The more direct the violence is in a weapon, the more acceptable it
seems. People seem to object to non-violent or even non-lethal, weapons more strongly than they do to the the most violent ones. While there
is an element of conditioning in this-we accept what we are used to
-weapons seem to be accepted the closer they approximate the
primitive violence of cutting, crushing, and stabbing. Ordinary shells,
bullets, and bombs are really only modern ways of reaching the same
bloody result that the caveman got with his stone ax or obsidiantipped spear. 189
If this analysis is correct, it presents a bleak prospect in terms of developing and using the necessary limited weapons for limited war unless there
is a reorientation of both military and civilian thinking in terms of facts.

4. Nuclear Weapons
It does not require detailed analysis to demonstrate that the use of
large nuclear weapons and of any thermonuclear weapons presents the
gravest problems concerning the restriction of military means employed
in limited war. Professor Osgood has questioned whether or not the use
of tactical nuclear weapons is consistent with the limitation of war. 190
He emphasizes that if such tactical weapons are used, national strategy
must control their use rather than the weapons use determining national
strategy. 191
General Taylor has also questioned the dangers involved in using even
"small" nuclear weapons:
[I]t also seems likely that there will be a desire to limit, if not to prevent, the use of atomic weapons in local conflicts for fear of their
unpredictable consequences in broadening the war. These tendencies
to restrict atomic weapons may also find support from the proprietor
of the battle zone, presumably a friend to whom we are bringing
military aid to resist aggression. There is such destructiveness in
atomic weapons, even in the small ones, that serious objection to their
use in friendly territory may be anticipated from the inhabitants. 192
It has been determined previously that nuclear weapons cannot be
convincingly appraised as unlawful per se. · It has been suggested that,
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in general war situations, there may be occasions when the tactical uses
of nuclear weapons will probably be appraised as lawful. 193 It is less possible, but certainly not impossible, that the same appraisal of the lawfulness
of particular tactical uses of nuclear weapons should be made in limited
war situations as well. Such appraisals of probable lawfulness could only
be made with assurance in situations where the traditional criteria of
reasonable proportionality between the military efficiency of the weapon
and the ancillary destruction of values could be demonstrated convincingly.
A naval authority has formulated some of the central considerations
involved in limited atomic warfare:
Atomic warfare can be kept limited only if the world-friend and
foe alike-knows the types and small sizes of weapons which could
be used and understands the vast difference between precision atomic
warfare and mass destruction warfare. Unless the difference between
precision atomic warfare and massive retaliation is made clear, and
our intention to use precision weapons delivered by precision means
made known, the United States is irretrievably headed toward nuclear
impotence, or drifting into what has been termed "atomic isolationism"
and being powerless to respond to "nibbling aggression." 194
In further development of this approach, the same writer has referred
to three specific military objectives in the Korean War in which naval
aircraft used traditional weapons in persistent attacks without achieving
militarily efficient results. These targets were the Yalu River bridges, the
key elements of the rail and road systems which were used to supply the
North Korean armies, and the principal hydroelectric complexes in North
Korea. 195 In his view, the precision delivery of tactical nuclear weapons
against these targets would have accomplished the military objectives without disproportionate ancillary damage. 196 Because of this, the examples
employed appear to meet the accepted juridical criteria for the lawful use
of weapons.
In appraisal of nuclear weapons in general war it was concluded that
the avoidance of civilian destruction is achieved most effectively by the
nonuse of these weapons. 197 This conclusion is obviously applicable in
limited war situations also. Since there has been considerable expenence
193
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with limited wars since the end of the Second World War, the future
projection which is grounded in past experience is that such wars are
much more probable than a general war. 198 In considering a future appraisal concerning the lawfulness of nuclear weapons use in limited war
it must be emphasized that the smaller the blast and ensuing radiation
effects, and the more clear the minimization, or avoidance, of ancillary
civilian destruction, the more likely an accurate appraisal of lawfulness
becomes. In the meantime, efforts to achieve a convention which effectively bans nuclear weapons should be intensified so that the appraisals
of lawfulness referred to may be only temporary.
198
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